“Juridical personality” in the Civil Code of Québec, extract updated to 1 September 2015

EXTRACT

© Éditeur officiel du Québec
Updated to 1 September 2015
This document has official status.

CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC
PRELIMINARY PROVISION

The Civil Code of Québec, in harmony with the Charter of human rights and freedoms (chapter C-12) and the general principles of law, governs persons, relations between persons, and property.

The Civil Code comprises a body of rules which, in all matters within the letter, spirit or object of its provisions, lays down the jus commune, expressly or by implication. In these matters, the Code is the foundation of all other laws, although other laws may complement the Code or make exceptions to it.

BOOK ONE
PERSONS

TITLE ONE
ENJOYMENT AND EXERCISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS

1. Every human being possesses juridical personality and has the full enjoyment of civil rights.

1991, c. 64, a. 1.

 

2. Every person is the holder of a patrimony.

It may be the subject of a division or of an appropriation to a purpose, but only to the extent provided by law.

1991, c. 64, a. 2; I.N. 2014-05-01.
 

3. Every person is the holder of personality rights, such as the right to life, the right to the inviolability and integrity of his person, and the right to the respect of his name, reputation and privacy.

These rights are inalienable.

1991, c. 64, a. 3.
 

4. Every person is fully able to exercise his civil rights.

In certain cases, the law provides for representation or assistance.

1991, c. 64, a. 4.
 

5. Every person exercises his civil rights under the name assigned to him and stated in his act of birth.

1991, c. 64, a. 5.
 

6. Every person is bound to exercise his civil rights in good faith.

1991, c. 64, a. 6.
 

7. No right may be exercised with the intent of injuring another or in an excessive and unreasonable manner, and therefore contrary to the requirements of good faith.

1991, c. 64, a. 7; I.N. 2014-05-01.
 

8. A person may only renounce the exercise of his civil rights to the extent consistent with public order.

1991, c. 64, a. 8; I.N. 2014-05-01.
 

9. In the exercise of civil rights, derogations may be made from those rules of this Code which supplement intention, but not from those of public order.

1991, c. 64, a. 9.
 

TITLE TWO
CERTAIN PERSONALITY RIGHTS

CHAPTER I
INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON

10. Every person is inviolable and is entitled to the integrity of his person.

Except in cases provided for by law, no one may interfere with his person without his free and enlightened consent.

1991, c. 64, a. 10.
 

SECTION I
CARE

11. No person may be made to undergo care of any nature, whether for examination, specimen taking, removal of tissue, treatment or any other act, except with his consent.

If the person concerned is incapable of giving or refusing his consent to care, a person authorized by law or by mandate given in anticipation of his incapacity may do so in his place.

1991, c. 64, a. 11.
 

12. A person who gives his consent to or refuses care for another person is bound to act in the sole interest of that person, taking into account, as far as possible, any wishes the latter may have expressed.

If he gives his consent, he shall ensure that the care is beneficial notwithstanding the gravity and permanence of certain of its effects, that it is advisable in the circumstances and that the risks incurred are not disproportionate to the anticipated benefit.

1991, c. 64, a. 12.
 

13. Consent to medical care is not required in case of emergency if the life of the person is in danger or his integrity is threatened and his consent cannot be obtained in due time.

It is required, however, where the care is unusual or has become useless or where its consequences could be intolerable for the person.

1991, c. 64, a. 13.
 

14. Consent to care required by the state of health of a minor is given by the person having parental authority or by his tutor.

A minor 14 years of age or over, however, may give his consent alone to such care. If his state requires that he remain in a health or social services establishment for over 12 hours, the person having parental authority or tutor shall be informed of that fact.

1991, c. 64, a. 14.
 

15. Where it is ascertained that a person of full age is incapable of giving consent to care required by his or her state of health, consent is given by his or her mandatary, tutor or curator. If the person of full age is not so represented, consent is given by his or her married, civil union or de facto spouse or, if the person has no spouse or his or her spouse is prevented from giving consent, it is given by a close relative or a person who shows a special interest in the person of full age.

1991, c. 64, a. 15; 2002, c. 6, s. 1.
 

16. The authorization of the court is necessary where the person who may give consent to care required by the state of health of a minor or a person of full age who is incapable of giving his consent is prevented from doing so or, without justification, refuses to do so; it is also necessary where a person of full age who is incapable of giving his consent categorically refuses to receive care, except in the case of hygienic care or emergency.

The authorization of the court is necessary, furthermore, to submit a minor 14 years of age or over to care which he refuses, except in the case of emergency if his life is in danger or his integrity threatened, in which case the consent of the person having parental authority or the tutor is sufficient.

1991, c. 64, a. 16; I.N. 2014-05-01.
 

17. A minor 14 years of age or over may give his consent alone to care not required by the state of his health; however, the consent of the person having parental authority or of the tutor is required if the care entails a serious risk for the health of the minor and may cause him grave and permanent effects.

1991, c. 64, a. 17.
 

18. Where the person is under 14 years of age or is incapable of giving his consent, consent to care not required by his state of health is given by the person having parental authority or the mandatary, tutor or curator; the authorization of the court is also necessary if the care entails a serious risk to health or if it may cause grave and permanent effects.

1991, c. 64, a. 18; I.N. 2014-05-01.
 

19. A person of full age who is capable of giving his consent may alienate a part of his body inter vivos, provided the risk incurred is not disproportionate to the benefit that may reasonably be anticipated.

A minor or a person of full age who is incapable of giving his consent may, with the consent of the person having parental authority, mandatary, tutor or curator and with the authorization of the court, alienate a part of his body only if that part is capable of regeneration and provided that no serious risk to his health results.

1991, c. 64, a. 19.
 

20. A person of full age who is capable of giving his consent may participate in research that could interfere with the integrity of his person provided that the risk incurred is not disproportionate to the benefit that can reasonably be anticipated. The research project must be approved and monitored by a research ethics committee.

1991, c. 64, a. 20; 2013, c. 17, s. 1.
 

21. A minor or a person of full age who is incapable of giving consent may participate in research that could interfere with the integrity of his person only if the risk incurred, taking into account his state of health and personal condition, is not disproportionate to the benefit that may reasonably be anticipated.

Moreover, a minor or a person of full age incapable of giving consent may participate in such research only if, where he is the only subject of the research, it has the potential to produce benefit to his health or only if, in the case of research on a group, it has the potential to produce results capable of conferring benefit to other persons in the same age category or having the same disease or handicap.

In all cases, a minor or a person of full age incapable of giving consent may not participate in such research where he understands the nature and consequences of the research and objects to participating in it.

The research project must be approved and monitored by a competent research ethics committee. Such a committee is formed by the Minister of Health and Social Services or designated by that Minister from among existing research ethics committees; the composition and operating conditions of such a committee are determined by the Minister and published in the Gazette officielle du Québec.

Consent to research that could interfere with the integrity of a minor may be given by the person having parental authority or the tutor. A minor 14 years of age or over, however, may give consent alone if, in the opinion of the competent research ethics committee, the research involves only minimal risk and the circumstances justify it.

Consent to research that could interfere with the integrity of a person of full age incapable of giving consent may be given by the mandatary, tutor or curator. However, where such a person of full age is not so represented and the research involves only minimal risk, consent may be given by the person qualified to consent to any care required by the state of health of the person of full age. Consent may also be given by such a qualified person where a person of full age suddenly becomes incapable of giving consent and the research, insofar as it must be undertaken promptly after the appearance of the condition giving rise to it, does not permit, for lack of time, the designation of a legal representative for the person of full age. In both cases, it is incumbent upon the competent research ethics committee to determine, when evaluating the research project, whether it meets the prescribed requirements.

1991, c. 64, a. 21; 1992, c. 57, s. 716; 1998, c. 32, s. 1; 2013, c. 17, s. 2.
 

22. A part of the body, whether an organ, tissue or other substance, removed from a person as part of the care he receives may, with his consent or that of the person qualified to give consent on his behalf, be used for purposes of research or, if he has died, be so used with the consent of the person who could give or could have given consent to any care required by his state of health.

1991, c. 64, a. 22; 2013, c. 17, s. 3; I.N. 2014-05-01.
 

23. When the court is called upon to rule on an application for authorization with respect to care or the alienation of a part of a person’s body, it obtains the opinions of experts, of the person having parental authority, of the mandatary, of the tutor or the curator and of the tutorship council; it may also obtain the opinion of any person who shows a special interest in the person concerned by the application.

The court is also bound to obtain the opinion of the person concerned unless that is impossible, and to respect his refusal unless the care is required by his state of health.

1991, c. 64, a. 23; 1998, c. 32, s. 2; I.N. 2014-05-01.
 

24. Consent to care not required by a person’s state of health, to the alienation of a part of a person’s body, or to research that could interfere with the integrity of his person shall be given in writing.

However, consent to such research may be given otherwise than in writing if justified in the circumstances in the opinion of a research ethics committee. In such a case, the committee determines the proper manner, for evidential purposes, of obtaining consent.

It may be withdrawn at any time, even verbally.

1991, c. 64, a. 24; 2013, c. 17, s. 4.
 

25. The alienation by a person of a part or product of his body shall be gratuitous; it may not be repeated if it involves a risk to his health.

A person’s participation in research that could interfere with the integrity of his person may not give rise to any financial reward other than the payment of an indemnity as compensation for the loss and inconvenience suffered.

1991, c. 64, a. 25; 2013, c. 17, s. 5.
 

SECTION II
CONFINEMENT IN AN INSTITUTION AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT

26. No person may be confined in a health or social services institution for a psychiatric assessment or following a psychiatric assessment concluding that confinement is necessary, without the person’s consent or without authorization by law or the court.

Consent may be given by the person having parental authority or, in the case of a person of full age unable to express his wishes, by his mandatary, tutor or curator. Such consent may be given by the representative only if the person concerned does not object.

1991, c. 64, a. 26; 1997, c. 75, s. 29; I.N. 2014-05-01.
 

27. Where the court has serious reasons to believe that a person is a danger to himself or to others owing to his mental state, it may, on the application of a physician or an interested person and notwithstanding the absence of consent, order that he be confined temporarily in a health or social services institution for a psychiatric assessment. The court may also, where appropriate, authorize any other medical examination that is necessary in the circumstances. The application, if refused, may not be submitted again except where different facts are alleged.

If the danger is grave and immediate, the person may be placed under preventive confinement, without the authorization of the court, as provided for in the Act respecting the protection of persons whose mental state presents a danger to themselves or to others (chapter P-38.001).

1991, c. 64, a. 27; 1997, c. 75, s. 30.
 

28. Where the court orders that a person be placed under confinement for a psychiatric assessment, an examination must be carried out within 24 hours after the person is taken in charge by the institution or, if the person was already under preventive confinement, within 24 hours of the court order.

If the physician who carries out the examination concludes that confinement in an institution is necessary, a second psychiatric examination must be carried out by another physician within 96 hours after the person is taken in charge by the institution or, if the person was already under preventive confinement, within 48 hours of the court order.

If a physician reaches the conclusion that confinement is not necessary, the person must be released. If both physicians reach the conclusion that confinement is necessary, the person may be kept under confinement without his consent or the authorization of the court for no longer than 48 hours.

1991, c. 64, a. 28; 1997, c. 75, s. 31.
 

29. A psychiatric examination report must deal in particular with the necessity of confining the person in an institution if he is a danger to himself or to others owing to his mental state, with the ability of the person who has undergone the examination to care for himself or to administer his property and, where applicable, with the advisability of instituting protective supervision of the person of full age.

The report must be filed with the court within seven days of the court order. It may not be disclosed, except to the parties, without the authorization of the court.

1991, c. 64, a. 29; 1997, c. 75, s. 32.
 

30. Confinement in an institution following a psychiatric assessment may only be authorized by the court if both psychiatric reports conclude that confinement is necessary.

Even if that is the case, the court may not authorize confinement unless the court itself has serious reasons to believe that the person is dangerous and that the person’s confinement is necessary, whatever evidence may be otherwise presented to the court and even in the absence of any contrary medical opinion.

1991, c. 64, a. 30; 1997, c. 75, s. 33; 2002, c. 19, s. 1.
 

30.1. A judgment authorizing confinement must also set the duration of confinement.

However, the person under confinement must be released as soon as confinement is no longer justified, even if the set period of confinement has not elapsed.

Any confinement required beyond the duration set by the judgment must be authorized by the court, in accordance with the provisions of article 30.

2002, c. 19, s. 1.
 

31. Every person confined in and receiving care in a health or social services establishment shall be informed by the establishment of the program of care established for him and of any important change in the program or in his living conditions.

If the person is under 14 years of age or is incapable of giving his consent, the information is given to the person who is qualified to give consent to care on his behalf.

1991, c. 64, a. 31; I.N. 2014-05-01.

 

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